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The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective 
Adam S. Hochschild* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of December 12, 2000 America watched as TV 
legal scholars scrambled to decipher the United States Supreme 
Court’s split decision in Bush v. Gore.1 Despite the six different 
opinions, that case turned out to be easy enough to understand. A 
clear majority of five Justices ruled the same way. Real problems 
arise when there is less than a clear majority speaking for the Court—
when the leading opinion of the Court is a plurality opinion. 
A Supreme Court plurality decision holds ambiguous precedential 
value. At the very least, plurality decisions bind the parties in the 
particular case.2 Our jurisprudential tradition further assumes that all 
cases elaborate a general rule of decision, or ratio decidendi, that 
applies to future cases involving similar issues.3 The discernment of a 
ratio decidendi from a majority opinion is generally uncontroversial 
because a majority opinion represents the rationale of a majority of 
Justices.4 But, the discernment of a ratio decidendi from a plurality 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000). 
 2. It appears that the majority requirement for Supreme Court judgments, as opposed to 
the precedential value of Court opinions, is purely a product of tradition and has been largely 
ignored by commentators. But see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and 
the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (suggesting that “it 
is firmly settled” that Justices would be “untroubled and unanimous” in recognizing the validity 
of a judgment supported by a mere majority). This Note focuses on the confusion surrounding 
the precedential value of Supreme Court plurality decisions and will deal only tangentially with 
the issue of the majority requirement for Court judgments.  
 3. See 1 WILLIAM BLACK STONE, COMMENTARIES *69-71; Nicholas St. John Green, 
Stare Decisis, 14 AM. L. REV. 609, 609-51 (1880); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, T HE STUDY OF 
CASES § 7 (1894) (“[A]lthough the court can pass upon no case except the one before it, the 
decision is a precedent for all cases in which the circumstances do not differ materially from the 
circumstances upon which the decision is made.”).  
 4. See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, supra  note 3, at § 47. 
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opinion, which represents the rationale of less than half of the 
Justices, is more problematic. A majority opinion may command 
more authority than a plurality decision,5 but precisely what authority 
does a plurality decision command? In other words, how should 
courts apply a plurality decision to subsequent controversies 
involving similar issues? 
This Note posits that the growing confusion surrounding plurality 
opinions is a foreseeable consequence of the formative years of the 
Supreme Court. The hubris of wielding federal judicial power, that 
has driven Justices since the Court’s inception, is the cause of the 
plurality opinion chaos. An examination of the history of the 
Supreme Court’s power and its methods of decision making suggests 
that the problem is deeply rooted in American law. Accordingly, an 
earnest solution involves a shift in our fundamental understanding of 
the Supreme Court’s role. We must begin, at least, by recognizing the 
esteemed and modest beginnings of the Supreme Court. 
Part I discusses the role of the early Court in terms of both its 
decision making procedures and its role as an institution within a 
federal system. Part IA is concerned with the Supreme Court under 
the first Chief Justice, John Jay. Under Chief Justice Jay, the 
Supreme Court exercised modest authority and employed a decision 
making process that generally is considered now to be outmoded and 
unhelpful. Part IB focuses on the legacy of Chief Justice John 
Marshall, who became Chief Justice seven years after Chief Justice 
Jay resigned. Often considered the father of the modern Court, Chief 
Justice Marshall strengthened the authority of the Court in the public 
eye and provided the framework for the Court’s new decision making 
system.  
Part II explains plurality decisions and discusses the confusion 
surrounding such opinions in the federal courts. Part III closely 
examines three exceptionally awkward Supreme Court plurality 
decisions that typify this confusion. Part IV considers some modern 
attempts, including the Court’s own, to solve the problem of plurality 
decision interpretation. Finally, Part V proposes a shift towards a 
modest, pre-Marshall, Jay-era vision of the role of the Supreme 
 
 5. But see infra  notes 155-58 and accompanying text. 
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Court, aimed at avoiding the plurality interpretation problem. 
I. THE EARLY COURT 
The early years of the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the 
modern problem of plurality decision interpretation. The mechanics 
of decision making changed significantly within the Court’s first 
fifteen years, helping to precipitate the current confusion. 
Originally, Supreme Court Justices each delivered individual 
opinions separately, or seriatim.6 The Supreme Court most likely 
derived the seriatim practice from English common law courts.7 The 
U.S. Constitution offers no guidance on the voting procedures of the 
Supreme Court. The drafters included one passing reference to the 
“Chief Justice,”8 but otherwise said nothing about the number of 
Justices on the Court, how the Court should decide cases, or in what 
sense lower courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions. 
A. Seriatim from the Beginning: The Court Under Chief Justice Jay 
Many twentieth-century Supreme Court historians argue that 
through the Court’s first eleven years, from 1789 to 1800, it was an 
ineffective and clumsy institution.9 These historians posit that the 
Court first became institutionally viable when John Marshall became 
 
 6. See generally SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott 
Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) [hereinafter SERIATIM]. 
 7. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial 
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 190 (1959). 
 8. “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that 
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, 
the Chief Justice shall preside. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  
 9. See, e.g., WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY , T HE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ITS HISTORY AND INFLUENCE IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 84-85 (1890) (“The history of 
the first ten years of the Supreme Court, from 1789 to 1800, is not the most important period of 
its existence.”). Two other Chief Justices served on the Court between Chief Justices Jay and 
Marshall: John Rutledge (1795) and Oliver Ellsworth (1796-1799). John Jay actually was 
nominated by President John Adams and confirmed by the Senate for a second term to begin in 
1800, but Jay refused to serve. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 12 (1968) (“The elegance of the justices’ attire [at the first public session of the Court] 
could, however, scarcely serve to conceal the relative ineffectiveness of the first Supreme 
Court, at least by comparison of what that tribunal was later to become.”). But see generally 
SERIATIM, supra  note 6 (containing eleven essays arguing that the pre-Marshall Court deserves 
more respect). 
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Chief Justice in 1801.10 According to these Marshall-centrist 
historians, Chief Justice Jay was altogether ineffective as the Court’s 
first Chief Justice.11 
Controversy surrounded Chief Justice Jay’s service on the Court. 
Chief Justice Jay was politically active outside the Court, 
simultaneously pursuing multiple governmental roles.12 During his 
tenure as Chief Justice from 1789 to 1794, he also served as secretary 
of state and the overseas diplomat to Great Britain, and successfully 
ran for governor of New York.13 While these activities raised 
concerns about constitutional separation of powers,14 Chief Justice 
Jay remained enthusiastic about his career choices,15 which were 
supported by the likes of President George Washington.16 Until the 
end of his tenure he was confident in his abilities as an ubiquitous 
public figure active beyond the bounds of the Supreme Court.17 
 
 10. See supra note 9. See also  Samuel L. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall in Historical 
Perpective, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 137, 137-38 (“Uncertain and often fragmented in its 
initial decade, the Court under Marhsall’s energetic and charismatic leadership, emerged as the 
principal guardian of the Constitution, a bulwark for individual rights and the ultimate arbiter of 
conflicts within the federal system.”) (footnotes omitted). When Jay refused to serve, Adams 
nominated and the Senate confirmed John Marshall, who began his Chief Justiceship in 1801. 
See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:  A  POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 71-72 (1992). 
 11. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
 12. See, e.g., Sandra VanBurkleo, “Honor, Justice, and Interest:” John Jay’s Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in SERIATIM, supra  note 6, at 32-52. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 747 (1971) (“The Jay appointment [to the 
ambassadorship to Great Britain] was roundly denounced as a violation of the principle of 
separation of powers” (citing BACHE’S GENERAL ADVERTISER, April 19, 28, 29, 1794, and May 
2, 1794; DUNLAP’S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, May 12, 1794)). 
 15. See VanBurkleo, supra  note 12, at 32. VanBurkleo writes: “In [Jay’s] own words, the 
problem at hand was to discover, within legal and political limits, how the new federal 
judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—might provide ‘due support to the national 
government’ in pursuit of ‘great and obvious principles of sound policy.’” Id. (citing Letter 
from John Jay to John Adams, Jan. 2, 1801, in IV T HE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF JOHN JAY 285 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891)). 
 16. See VanBurkleo, supra  note 12, at 45 (“Historians of the Jay Court often decry these 
bifurcated interests and credentials, but Washington found them uniquely compatible with 
American needs and priorities in 1789.”) (citing Letter from George Washington, President of 
the United States, to John Jay (Oct. 5, 1789); Instructions to Envoy Extraordinary, May 6, 
1794, in III T HE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 378-79 (Henry P. 
Johston ed., 1891)). 
 17. See VanBurkleo, supra  note 12, at 46 (Jay “abruptly and freely abandoned the bench 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/9
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Chief Justice Jay was also politically active on the Court. He 
hoped for national unity and believed that this fundamental American 
objective required diminished state power.18 Chief Justice Jay 
preached his support of Federalism in the Federalist Papers19 and was 
eager to use the Supreme Court to further this goal.20  
In Chisholm v. Georgia,21 the Court’s first important decision,22 
Chief Justice Jay exhibited his nationalism seriatim.23 The issue 
Chisholm posed was whether a state could be sued by citizens of 
another state.24 The Court held by a 5-1 vote that Georgia was subject 
to liability.25 In a well-articulated opinion,26 Chief Justice Jay argued 
 
when he perceived that national ‘objects’ were best pursued elsewhere.”). Id. 
 18. See WILLOUGHBY , supra  note 9, at 84. John Jay writes: 
What power should be granted to the government so constituted, is a question that 
deserves much thought. I think the more the better: the States retaining only so much 
as may be necessary for domestic purposes, and all their principal officers, civil and 
military, being commissioned and removable by the National Government. 
Id. 
 19. T HE FEDERALIST NOS. 2-5, 64 (John Jay). In Federalist 2, Jay writes: 
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as 
if it was the design of Providence that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a 
band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a 
number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.  
T HE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 36 (John Jay) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). 
 20. See, e.g., VanBurkleo, supra  note 12, at 39-40; GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 159, 472-73 (1969); Martin Diamond, What the Framers Meant by 
Federalism , in A NATION OF STATES 31-33 (Robert Goodwin ed., 1974); Letter from John Jay 
to George Washington, March 16, 1786, in III T HE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
JOHN JAY 186-87 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891). 
 21. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 13; GOEBEL, supra  note 14, at 728. Goebel notes that 
the seriatim opinions in Chisholm  deserve to be considered more or less at large, for not only 
was this the first great case to be decided by the Court, but also the Court delivered the opinions 
at a moment when factional divisions over the limits of national authority lent explosive force 
to the issue sub judice. Id. See also  John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State 
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-1941 (1983) (stating 
that Federalists demanded the assertion of federal jurisdiction over suits against states in order 
to enforce the Peace Treaty of 1783 with Great Britain). 
 23. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469-79 (Jay, C.J., opinion). For more on the seriatim 
practice of the early Court, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 24. See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469 (Jay, C.J., opinion). 
 25. Id. at 480. 
 26. Jay delivered “one of the most clear, profound and elegant arguments perhaps ever 
given in a court of judicature.” GOEBEL, supra note 14, at 732 (quoting DUNLAP’S AMERICAN 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 21, 1793). Goebel himself commented that the opinion was 
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vehemently that citizens should be able to sue states.27 The decision, 
however, was met with widespread hostility.28 The public uproar 
soon inspired a national movement to amend the Constitution, and in 
1798 the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, instituting state 
sovereignty and superceding Chisholm.29 
The aftermath of the Chisholm case destroyed Chief Justice Jay’s 
dreams of a strong, authoritative Court.30 Chief Justice Jay remained 
proud of the Chisholm decision and was disappointed to see its 
demise.31 His disillusionment with what he perceived to be the 
Court’s futility ultimately led to his resignation in 1795, two years 
after Chisholm, and three years before ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment.32 
Throughout his career Chief Justice Jay remained a staunch 
 
“considerably less than this but must be considered at large because it is the chief exhibit on 
Jay’s judicial prowess.” GOEBEL, supra  note 14, at 732. 
 27. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469-79 (Jay, C.J., opinion ). 
 28. In Georgia, the state House of Representatives proposed a resolution that declared that 
the state was not bound by unfavorable Supreme Court decisions and that the state would 
disregard them as unconstitutional. GOEBEL, supra  note 14, at 734. The Georgia circuit court 
presented a grievance to the Supreme Court that read in part: “We present as a grievance the 
decision of the Supreme Court, in a question relative to the liability of the State of Georgia to 
answer an Action commenced against her by one individual of another State, exclusive of the 
incompatibility of Sovereignty and liability to be sued.” GOEBEL, supra  note 14, at 735 n.42. 
The Georgia Governor also delivered a defiant message to the Court. GOEBEL, supra note 14, at 
735. Formal resolut ions in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York also expressed 
unwillingness to follow the Supreme Court. Id. at 735-36.  
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id. 
 30. See VanBurkleo, supra note 12, at 49 (“The outcry after Chisholm and the related 
march toward constitutional limitation completely shattered Jay’s ever-diminishing faith in the 
high court’s political and diplomatic utility.”). But see Irving Dillard, John Jay, in 1 T HE 
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: T HEIR LIVES AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS 15, 16 (Leon Frieman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). Dillard argues, albeit weakly, that 
Chief Justice Jay took the public reaction to Chisholm in stride. Id. Dillard writes that despite 
the “setback” to Chief Justice Jay’s vision for the Court , Chief Justice Jay was not devastated 
by Congress and the states resorting to the amending process to overturn the Chisholm decision. 
He believed the duty of the Supreme Court was to interpret and apply the Constitution, leaving 
it to Congress and the states to use their best judgment to seek constitutional changes. Id.  
 31. See VanBurkleo, supra  note 12, at 49, and accompanying quote in note 30. 
 32. See id. at 50 (“Jay’s resignation thus symbolized keen disappointment, and from the 
point of view of his colleagues marooned on a sinking federal bench, the situation could only 
get worse.”). 
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advocate of nationalist principles.33 His desire for a centralized 
federal power was antithetical to the framers’ modest aspirations for 
the Supreme Court.34 Chief Justice Jay departed the Court realizing 
that America, at that time, wanted nothing more than modesty in its 
court of last resort.35 
B. Marshall and Consolidated Opinions 
In 1801 John Marshall became Chief Justice and helped establish 
the strong, authoritative Court for which Chief Justice Jay had 
hoped.36 Chief Justice Marshall provided the framework for the 
modern understanding of both the Supreme Court’s authority and the 
Court’s system of decision making.37 Concerned about the ambiguous 
precedential value of seriatim decisions, Chief Justice Marshall 
introduced and established the practice of the Chief Justice 
announcing a single opinion which represented the undivided 
“opinion of the Court.”38 
 
 33. See generally VanBurkleo, supra  note 12; Dillard, supra  note 30. 
 34. See T HE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
[T]he judiciary . . . will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The 
executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The 
legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties 
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatsoever. It may truly be 
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.  
Id. See also  MONTESQUIEU, 1 T HE SPIRIT OF LAWS 178 (Thomas Nugent trans., Robert Clarkeo 
Co. 1873) (“Of the three powers above mentioned [Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary], the 
JUDICIARY is . . . next to nothing.”). See also infra  note 43 and accompanying text 
(discussing Thomas Jefferson’s harsh criticisms of Chief Justice Marshall’s attempts to bring 
more authority to the Supreme Court).  
 35. See VanBurkleo, supra note 12, at 49-50. 
 36. See supra  Part IA. 
 37. Without Justice Marshall, Charles Evan Hughes, who served as Chief Justice from 
1930 to 1941, likely would not have said,  “The constitution is what the judges say it is.” 
SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 11-12 (1951). 
 38. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, T HE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF 
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE  218-19 (7th ed. 1993); 3 
ALBERT BEVERIDGE, T HE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919). Chief Justice Marshall began 
the practice of consolidating opinions in “Amelia’s Case.” Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Chief Justice Marshall based this policy on ideology and 
efficiency.39 He intended to instill public confidence in Supreme 
Court opinions so that the Supreme Court could enforce nationalist, 
federalist policy.40 He attempted to eliminate fear amongst lawyers 
and lower courts that the Supreme Court would revisit closely 
decided cases and subsequently overrule them.41 However, later in his 
tenure as Chief Justice, Supreme Court decisions were published 
regularly with multiple opinions.42  
Marshall’s single-opinion policy was not without its critics. 
During Marshall’s tenure, many respected legal and political figures, 
including President Thomas Jefferson, condemned Chief Justice 
Marshall’s authoritarian consolidation of opinions as fascistic.43 
 
1 (1801). Chief Justice Marshall’s new procedure seemed to have begun triumphantly; Amelia’s 
Case established “an important rule of international law and is of permanent value.” 
BEVERIDGE, supra at 16. Scott Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court before John Marshall 
in SERIATIM, supra  note 6, at 20. 
 39. See R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross Prize Essay: Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J.  821, 821 (1952) (explaining that Marshall believed a unified voice 
would strengthen the “power and dignity of the Court” (quoting 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA  969 (1951)); Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to be a Part: The Precedential 
Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2086-87 (1995); 
BEVERIDGE, supra  note 38, at 16 (“Marshall took the first step in impressing the country with 
the unity of the highest court of the Nation.”). Justice Frankfurter claimed that the Court 
abandoned seriatim opinions for efficiency’s sake. The Court’s increase in the number of cases 
it heard required the consolidation of opinions. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 
466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 40. See, e.g., 1 LOUIS B. BOUDIN,  GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY  267-316 (1932) 
(discussing Marshall and his nationalistic judicial activism); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. 
HARBISON, T HE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 257-83 (5th ed. 
1976) (discussing the same). See also  Herbert Alan Johnson, John Marshall, in THE JUSTICES 
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: T HEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 
supra  note 30, at 290-91 (“Primarily, [Marshall] was a man who strongly supported the concept 
of federal supremacy over the states. This dominant theme is the focal point of McCulloch v. 
Maryland [17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)], yet it is the leitmotif of nearly every Marshall 
opinion in the Constitutional field.”). 
 41. See ZoBell, supra  note 7, at 193 (noting that Marshall’s opinions were the opinions of 
the Supreme Court as a whole); G.P.J. McGinley, The Search for Unity: The Impact of 
Consensus Seeking Procedures in Appellate Courts, 11 ADEL. L. REV. 203, 210-12 (1987) 
(observing that lower courts tend to view majority decisions as more authoritative than a series 
of seriatim  opinions and consensus lends authority to an opinion).  
 42. The first recorded concurrence during Marshall’s tenure as Justice was Huidekoper’s 
Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment). See 
ZoBell, supra note 7, at 195. 
 43. Jefferson considered Marshall’s policy a “dangerous engine of consolidation.” 
Moorhead, supra  note 39, at 821. Jefferson also was convinced that the new policy would make 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/9
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Others suggest that Chief Justice Marshall was so concerned with 
controlling and maintaining authoritative decisions that he claimed a 
majority supported the “opinion of the Court” when actually less than 
a majority agreed with it.44 
Moreover, the abolition of seriatim decisions arguably led to an 
emphasis on mustering a majority vote rather than publishing a well-
reasoned, principled opinion.45 Some Justices, including Chief 
Justices Salmon P. Chase and William Howard Taft and Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, often joined majority opinions in order to 
preserve their political capital amongst their brethren.46 An 
alternative explanation, perhaps, is that the early American republic 
needed a formidable and unified voice.47 The modern model of a 
 
Justices “lazy” and “incompetent” because “nobody knows what opinion any individual 
member gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion concurred in it himself.” 
David O. Stewart, A Chorus of Voices, 77 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (1991). 
 44. ZoBell, supra note 7, at 193 n.41. 
 45. ALEXANDER BICKEL, T HE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, 18-19 
(1957). Bickel noted that Justice Brandeis joined the majority in Atherton Mills v. Johnson 
(Child Labor Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922), for tactical reasons. Id. Bickel quoted Justice Brandeis 
as remarking, “‘Can’t always dissent,’ and also referring to Holmes’ reluctance to dissent again 
after he had once had his say on a subject.” Id. at 18. Bickel believed that it “might have 
seemed to Brandeis churlish, and a disservice in the long run to his effectiveness . . . and to his 
future relations with the new Chief Justice, Taft, to turn around at this juncture and register a 
dissent.” Id. But see Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the 
Book of Brandeis, 1 J. AM. HIST. 125, 133-51 (June 1992) (casting doubt on Bickel’s thesis). 
See also  RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 176 
(1997) (noting Bickel’s and Spilenger’s arguments in the light of voting distributions on the 
Supreme Court in New Deal Commerce Clause cases). 
 46. Chase served as Chief Justice from 1864-1873. Taft served as Chief Justice from 
1921-1930. Holmes served as Associate Justice from 1902-1931. BICKEL, supra note 45, at 18. 
See also  SALMON P. CHASE , T HE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS vol. 1, 517 (John Niven ed., 
1993). Chase explained that he rarely filed dissents because he thought “that except in very 
important causes [filing a] dissent [was] inexpedient.” Id. See also David M. O’Brien, 
Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual 
Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 91-93 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds. , 1999) (discussing incidents of dissent 
suppression on the Supreme Court). The authors quote Taft: 
I don’t approve of dissentings generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from 
the majority, it is more important to stand by the Court and give it s judgment weight 
than merely to record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain 
than to have it settled either way. 
Id. at 93 (citing ALPHEUS T. MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE 
SOCIETY  66, 223 (1956)). 
 47. See, e.g., JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 1-2 (1996) 
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strong Supreme Court with consolidated, albeit sometimes 
fragmented, opinions was perhaps the necessary means by which to 
advance republican values in the young nation.48 
Consolidated opinions of the Court would not exist without Chief 
Justice Marshall’s innovations.49 By eliminating the seriatim 
practice,50 Chief Justice Marshall laid the groundwork for the 
hermeneutically confusing mixtures of joint opinions, concurrences, 
and dissents.51 Few people today question the “Marshall law” of 
consolidated opinions.52 Ironically, despite Chief Justice Marshall’s 
insistence on abolishing fractured, seriatim decisions and maintaining 
straightforward precedents, divided decisions now are more common 
 
(arguing, as the title of the book suggests, that Marshall “define[d] the nation” by strengthening 
the Court’s role in the interests of nationalist, Federalist policy); Olken, supra note 10, at 138 
(reviewing Smith’s book and affirming his thesis). Other biographies of Marshall include: 
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974); BEVERIDGE, supra note 38; 
CHARLES F. HOBSON, T HE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(1996); FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1981); 
JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901); G. EDWARD WHITE , T HE AMERICAN JUDICIAL 
T RADITION:  PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 7-34 (Oxford Paper ed. 1978) 
(discussing Marshall); Joseph Story, A Discourse upon the Life, Character, and Services of the 
Honorable John Marshall, in 3 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE , CHARACTER, AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 
327 (John F. Dillon ed., 1903). Marshall also wrote an autobiography, JOHN MARSHALL, AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH  (J.S. Adams ed., 1937).  
 48. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 47, at 1-2; Olken, supra  note 10, at 137-38. In his 
panegyric to the Marshall court, Olken writes:  
[O]ver the course of three and a half decades, the Marshall Court delineated the limits 
of government in a democratic republic and, in so doing, bolstered the prestige of the 
federal judiciary while preserving the delicate balance between state and federal 
authority. Constitutional supremacy, judicial independence and dedication to the rule 
of law characterized the philosophy of the Court during this era. 
Id. at 138. 
 49. See supra  notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra  note 38 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra  notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
 52. Recent scholarship assumes the validity of joint opinions, focusing on the 
interpretation of concurring and plurality opinions rather than on whether split decisions are 
valid at all. See, e.g., Kirman, supra note 39; Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the 
Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593 (1992); Mark Alan Thurmon, 
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decisions, 42 DUKE L. J. 419 (1992). Two articles, written in 1952, address the question of the 
validity of split decisions: Moorhead, supra  note 39 and Richard B. Stephens, The Function of 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952). 
Both articles defend the practice of separate opinion writing, though neither advocates the 
Court’s original seriatim practice. 
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and more confusing.53 
II. A MODERN PROBLEM : PLURALITY DECISIONS 
Against the backdrop of the Jay and Marshall eras, this Note 
addresses plurality opinions, a particularly problematic outgrowth of 
the early Court. 
A. Establishing a Plurality Decision 
Plurality decisions result from several different scenarios. In all 
Court decisions, a majority of the Justices must support “judgment 
X.” Within that judgment-majority, the Justices agreeing on judgment 
X may have different rationales for reaching that conclusion. If five 
or more Justices out of the nine on the Court support judgment X and 
a particular given rationale, A, the Court has established a majority 
decision. If less than five agree on the rationale (yielding rationales A 
and B, and conceivably as many as nine), then the Court has 
established a plurality decision. The plurality opinion, therefore, 
represents the majority rationale for the majority judgment. 
For example, five Justices could support judgment X, and within 
that judgment-majority, three Justices support rationale A and two 
Justices support rationale B. Further, assume four dissenting Justices 
support judgment Y and agree on their dissenting rationale. The three 
Justices supporting judgment X and rationale A will write the 
plurality decision. Although a plurality of Justices, four, agrees on the 
dissenting rationale, a majority disagrees with the dissent’s judgment. 
Accordingly, the group of three, supporting judgment X and rationale 
A, writes the plurality decision for the Court. 
A Justice may opt not to join an opinion, thereby preventing the 
establishment of a majority decision and instead establishing a 
plurality decision. In general, there are three reasons a Justice might 
do this: to limit the plurality rationale, to expand the plurality 
rationale, or to provide an entirely different rationale for the majority 
judgment.54 
 
 53. See, e.g., supra  note 6 and accompanying text.  
 54. One scholar attempted to discern four categories of concurrences: the limiting 
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Recently, some commentators have insisted that a “false 
plurality,” or true majority, exists when a fifth Justice writes 
independently of a four-Justice plurality, but concurs in both 
judgment and rationale.55 This theory seems to echo Chief Justice 
Marshall’s bias that seriatim opinion writing must bow to the need 
for a consolidated, authoritative voice.56 
B. The Increasing Prevalence of Plurality Decisions 
Fractured opinions have increased dramatically since Chief Justice 
Marshall’s tenure.57 Despite his enduring influence, a number of 
factors account for the proliferation of plurality opinions. Today 
Supreme Court decisions are generally longer, more detailed, and 
divided into parts,58 providing increased opportunities for 
 
concurrence, the expansive concurrence, the doctrinal concurrence, and the emphatic 
concurrence. Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by 
the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777 (1990). The limiting concurrence agrees only 
to a certain extent with the plurality rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The expansive concurrence agrees with the plurality 
rationale entirely, but would expand it even further. See, e.g., id. at 584 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). The doctrinal concurrence provides an entirely different theory of support of the 
majority judgment. The emphatic concurrence agrees with the plurality rationale in its entirety 
but emphasizes a certain aspect or aspects. See supra Ray, at 789-809. It seems, however, that 
the emphatic concurrence is a species of expansive concurrence. In terms of a concurring 
opinion’s relationship to the plurality opinion, such concurrences can be divided into two 
general categories—those that join the plurality opinion and those that do not. See Kirman, 
supra note 39, at 2088. The author argues that these polar classifications are more helpful than 
Ray’s four categories: “The evolution of the Court’s opinion writing process—from the 
issuance of multiple separate opinions to announcing judgment in an opinion by a majority of 
the Court that is often accompanied by separate opinions—suggests an alternative, and simpler, 
classification.” Id. These classifications, however, fail to account for the difficulty in 
interpreting limiting and expansive concurrences in relation to the plurality opinion. That is to 
say, it is not always clear whether limiting and expansive occurrences ultimately approve of the 
plurality rationale. See infra  Parts IV and V. 
 55. See Thurmon, supra  note 52, at 1 n.1; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130-32 (1981); Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear 
Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956).  
 56. See generally supra Part I. 
 57. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 357; Kimura, supra note 52, at 1593 n.3; Kirman, 
supra  note 39, at 2083. 
 58. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 
807-14 (1982) (arguing that the prevalence of longer, more detailed opinions is appropriate in 
the interests of “full exposition”). 
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disagreement.59 In addition, the alleged decline of leadership on the 
Court may contribute to fractured decisions.60 Even Chief Justice 
Marshall’s strongest critics would concede that he was an 
incomparably strong leader of the Court.61 The growing prominence 
and power of the Supreme Court over the past 200 years also may 
have led Justices to attach their names to the opinions of others more 
judiciously.62 
As discussed in Part I, each generation of the Court adopted Chief 
Justice Marshall’s belief that a unified voice was necessary and 
practicable for the survival and growth of the republic. 
III. EXCEPTIONALLY CONFUSING PLURALITY OPINIONS 
Three Supreme Court cases present archetypal instances of the 
confusion caused by plurality decisions. In National Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,63 the Court addressed the 
validity of a federal statute that purportedly gave district courts 
jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of states and citizens 
of the District of Columbia.64 Justice Jackson, writing for a plurality 
of three Justices,65 found proper jurisdiction.66 Justice Jackson 
adhered to the holding of Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey,67 in which 
Chief Justice Marshall ruled that a citizen of the District of Columbia 
was not a citizen of a state for diversity purposes.68 However, Justice 
 
 59.  Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression 
in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 72 (1980) (arguing that Justices should seek a 
consensus more often in order to prevent fractured decisions). 
 60. See Cox, supra note 58, at 72-73; Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). Before he became 
Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist attempted to rebut the argument that the Court has witnessed 
declining leadership. William H. Rehnquist, “All Discord, Harmony Not Understood”: The 
Performance of the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 973 (1980).  
 61. See generally SERIATIM, supra  note 6 (compiling essays attacking, at least 
tangentially, the legend of John Marshall). 
 62. But see supra note 46 and accompanying text for evidence that in certain situations 
some Justices have suppressed their own dissents to join majority decisions.  
 63. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). 
 64. Id. at 583. 
 65. Justice Jackson wrote for Justices Black, Jackson, and Burton. Id. 
 66. Id. at 604. 
 67. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805). 
 68. Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. at  587 (citing Hepburn and Dundas, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
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Jackson upheld the statute on the grounds that Congress has the 
power to grant non-Article III jurisdiction69 to Article III courts.70 
Justices Murphy and Rutledge concurred in judgment but disagreed 
entirely with Justice Jackson’s reasoning.71 Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge believed that the Hepburn case should be overruled72 and 
that Congress does not have authority to grant such jurisdiction.73 The 
third group of Justices, consisting of Chief Justice Vinson and 
Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas, dissented in the judgment.74 
The dissenting Justices agreed that the Hepburn case should be 
upheld,75 but argued along with Justices Murphy and Rutledge that 
Congress may not grant non-Article III jurisdiction to Article III 
courts.76 
Despite the apparent paradox,77 the Court upheld the statute in a 
 
at 453).  
 69. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides, in part: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between 
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of 
different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.  
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Note that the language itself does not suggest whether this list is 
exclusive or inclusive for the purpose of determining federal jurisdiction. 
 70. 337 U.S. at 600. 
 71. Id. at 604 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“I join in the Court’s judgment. But I strongly 
dissent from the reasons assigned to support it in the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson.”).  
 72. Id. at 617-25 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 606-17. 
 74. Id. at 626-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 646-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 75. Id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 651-52 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 76. 337 U.S. at 626-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 646-55 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  
 77. See 337 U.S. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurther wrote: 
A substantial majority of the Court agrees that each of the two grounds urged in 
support of the attempt by Congress to extend diversity jurisdiction to cases involving 
citizens of the District of Columbia must be rejected—but not the same majority. And 
so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result—paradoxical as it may 
appear—which differing majorities of the Court find insupportable. 
Id. 
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decision78 in which seven Justices rejected one ground79 for 
upholding the statute, and six Justices rejected the second ground.80 
Nevertheless, Justice Jackson wrote the plurality because his group 
represented the majority rationale for the majority judgment. 
Similarly, in Apodaca v. Oregon81 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a state court criminal conviction constitutionally requires a 
unanimous jury.82 Justice White, writing for a plurality that included 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, 
concluded that a criminal defendant is not entitled to a unanimous 
verdict in state court.83 The plurality held that although the applicable 
federal rule is relevant to state law per incorporation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,84 the applicable, incorporated federal rule 
does not include a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.85  
Justice Powell agreed with the judgment.86 However, he disagreed 
 
 78. See 337 U.S. at 582.  
 79. See supra  notes 67, 75 and accompanying text. Namely, the Justices rejected 
overruling the Hepburn  case. 
 80. See supra  notes 73, 76 and accompanying text. Namely, the Justices found no 
Congressional authority. 
 81. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 82. Id. at 406. In an interesting note, compare majority judgment requirements of 
Supreme Court decisions with the unanimity requirements of criminal verdicts. 406 U.S. at 407 
n.2. The origin of the requirement of unanimous decisions in criminal verdicts is “shrouded in 
obscurity.” Id. The Court in Apodaca cited the following four possible theories for the 
unanimity requirement: (1) Unanimity developed to compensate for the lack of other 
procedures that would help guarantee a fair trial, id. (citing LESTER ORFIELD, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 347-351 (1947) and William Haralson, Unanimous Jury 
Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 MISS. L.J.  185, 191 (1950)); (2) Unanimity arose out of the 
Middle Ages’ practice of trial by corrobative testimony of innocence, or compurgation, 
requiring 12 compurgators for acquittal, id. (citing PATRICK DEVLIN, T RIAL BY JURY 48-49 
(1956); John V. Ryan, Less than Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY.  & POL. SCI. 211, 213 (1967)); (3) Medievalists insisted upon one true 
understanding of the facts. To avoid perjury, juries tended to reach the same verdict, id. (citing 
T HEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956) and 
T HAYER, supra  note 47, at 297); (4) The medieval concept of consent, or consensus, demanded 
unanimity, id. Parliamentary majoritarianism, for example, is only as old as the fifteenth 
century. Id. (citing M. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 251 (1964); 
T HEODORE  PLUCKNETT, T HE LANCASTRIAN CONSTITUTION, IN TUDOR STUDIES 161, 169-170 
(R. Seton-Watson ed. 1924) and 1 KENNETH PICKTHORN , EARLY T UDOR GOVERNMENT: 
HENRY VII 93 (1967)).  
 83. 406 U.S.  at 413-14. 
 84. Id. at 411-12. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366-68 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p261 Hochschild.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
276 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:261 
 
 
with the plurality’s rationale,87 just as Justices Murphy and Rutledge 
concurred in judgment and disagreed with the plurality’s rationale in 
Tidewater Transfer.88 Justice Powell argued uniquely that while 
federal jury trials require unanimity (the minority opinion),89 
incorporation was inapplicable (the plurality opinion).90 Accordingly, 
Justice Powell concluded that the Constitution does not require 
unanimous convictions.91  
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented.92 The 
four Justices agreed with the plurality that incorporation is 
applicable 93 but disagreed with the plurality are found that federal 
convictions must be unanimous.94 Like the dissenters in Tidewater 
Transfer,95 the dissenters in Apodaca lost 5-4 on the judgment,96 even 
though they commanded a majority of support for each of the 
relevant underlying issues: incorporation (8-1) and federal unanimity 
requirements (5-4).97 
Finally, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company,98 the Court held 
by a vote of 5-4 that a federal statute permitted suits against the state 
of Pennsylvania.99 The four Justices constituting the plurality100 held 
 
 87. Id. at 366-80 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 88. See supra  notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 89. 406 U.S. at 369-77 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. at 378-80 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 92. Justice Stewart wrote one dissenting opinion, which Justices Brennan and Marshall 
joined, id. at 414 (Stewart, J. dissenting), Justice Brennan wrote another dissenting opinion, 
which Justice Marshall joined, id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Justice Douglas wrote a 
third dissenting opinion, which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Id. at 380 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 93. 406 U.S. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 406 U.S. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); 406 U.S. at 380-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 94. 406 U.S. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 406 U.S. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); 406 U.S. at 394 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 95. See supra  notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 96. The votes lined up as follows: Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist (five) versus Justices Douglas, Brennan, Steart, and Marshall (four). 
 97. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text. 
 98. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
Despite the fact that Union Gas has been overruled, it remains relevant to a discussion of Court 
pluralities. Indeed, the Court apparently overruled Union Gas in part because it was a plurality 
opinion that led to “confusion” amongst the lower courts. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. See 
also supra  notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 99. 491 U.S. at 23. 
 100. Id. at 5, 23. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
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that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in a Commerce Clause case101 and that the statute in 
question effected such an abrogation.102 The three dissenting 
Justices103 argued in favor of state immunity. They claimed that 
Congress does not have the power to abrogate immunity under the 
Commerce Clause104 and thus this statute could not possibly effect 
such an abrogation.105 
Justice White concurred with the plurality in judgment, but took a 
distinct route to his conclusion. He contended that the statute does not 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.106 He observed, however, 
that a majority of the Court disagreed with him on this issue of 
statutory interpretation.107 Deferring to this majority,108 Justice White 
decided that Congress has the authority to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.109  
Justice Scalia dissented in judgment and argued in juxtaposition to 
Justice White. Concurring with the plurality, Justice Scalia found that 
the statute abrogated immunity.110 However, dissenting from the 
plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that Congress lacks the authority 
to abrogate this immunity.111 
 
Stevens.  
 101. Id. at 14-23. 
 102. Id. at 7-13. 
 103. Id. at 45. The Justices dissenting on the issue of immunity were Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. 
 104. 491 U.S.  at 30-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia 
authored this opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined 
only as to Parts II, III, and IV, at 30-45. For an interesting discussion of the prevalence of 
writing opinions in “Parts,” see Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the 
Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1993) (“[I]n recent years 
Justices commonly have separated their opinions into numbered parts by issue, inviting the 
other Justices to shop among the parts, creating an environment of issue-by-issue 
deliberation.”). 
 105. Union Gas, 491 U.S.  at 30-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 106. Id. at 45-57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 107. Id. at 56-57 (“My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however; a majority of 
the Court has ruled that the statute, as amended, plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of 
the States from suit in the federal courts.”). 
 108. Id. at 57 (“I accept that judgment.”). 
 109. Id. (“In that respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan . . . that 
Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of 
the States, although I do not agree with much of his reasoning.”). 
 110. 491 U.S. at 29-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 111. 491 U.S. at 30-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Justice White, unlike Justice Scalia, adjusted his decision 
midstream.112 If Justice White individually had pursued a consistent 
line of reasoning and disregarded his colleagues’ reasoning, he likely 
would have voted differently on the judgment. In other words, 
because he interpreted the statute to not effect an abrogation of 
immunity, he surely would have recognized Pennsylvania’s immunity 
under the statute. Furthermore, because Justice White elected to defer 
to the majority of the Court on the issue of statutory interpretation, he 
provided the necessary fifth vote to permit suit against Pennsylvania. 
If Justice White had followed his own reasoning, his vote would have 
forced the opposite result and shifted the judgment from 5-4 in favor 
of allowing suit versus Pennsylvania to 5-4 against allowing the 
suit.113 
The Court subsequently overruled Union Gas in 1996.114 The 
Court reasoned that Union Gas was merely a plurality decision, that 
Justice White represented the fifth vote necessary for a majority 
judgment, that Justice White substantially disagreed with the 
plurality’s reasoning,115 and that the decision departed from 
established law.116 
IV. MODERN ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PLURALITY 
INTERPRETATION 
At common law and throughout the nineteenth century, 
fragmented or seriatim decisions were authoritative only as to the 
judgment, not as to the rationale.117 That is, courts did not look to 
plurality decisions for ratios decidendis; these cases yielded 
precedential weight only in subsequent cases that presented 
substantially similar facts.118 Authoritative rationales, applicable to 
subsequent cases, required majority support. 
 
 112. See supra  notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra  notes 105-11 and accompanying text. 
 114. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
 115. Id at 59-60. 
 116. Id. at 66. 
 117. See, e.g., HENRY C. BLACK , HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, OR 
THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 135-36 (1912); RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN 
ENGLISH LAW 84-93 (1991); WAMBAUGH, supra  note 3, § 48; Thurmon, supra note 52, at 420. 
 118. See supra  note 117. 
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Chief Justice Marshall’s legacy of consolidation and 
fragmentation muddles the traditional understanding of the authority 
of fragmented, plurality opinions. It remains unclear whether a 
majority is necessary to establish mandatory authority, whether a 
plurality opinion is just as authoritative as a majority opinion, or 
whether plurality opinions should be read in conjunction with 
concurring opinions in order to cobble together a controlling, 
majority rationale. 
But, by 1977 it seemed that the Supreme Court had established 
guidelines for interpreting the precedential value of plurality 
opinions. In Marks v. United States the Court stated that “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”119 The 
Marks test represented a conscious attempt to end the confusion 
surrounding plurality decisions’ precedential value.120 
Lower courts incorporated the Marks test with varying degrees of 
success.121 In applying the Marks test, some courts focused on the 
implicit consensus amongst the plurality opinion and the concurring 
opinion or opinions (the “implicit consensus” model).122 Other courts 
focused on Marks’ implied license to predict how the Supreme Court 
 
 119. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, J.) and interpreting the plurality decision of A Book Named “John 
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 
413 (1966)). In Marks, Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall who concurred in part and 
dissented in part, agreed with the majority with respect to the “narrowest grounds” test. Id. at 
197-98. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also agreed with the 
narrowest grounds test and, in fact, agreed “with everything said in the Court’s opinion” short 
of its judgment remanding the case. Id. at 198. 
 120. Id. at 193. 
 121. See Thurmon, supra  note 52, at 428-442, for discussion of the interpretive models 
cited here: the “implicit consensus” model and the “predictive” model. 
 122. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992). 
Marks is workable—one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ than 
another—only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions. In 
essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator of the Court’s 
reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who 
support the judgment. 
Id. 
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would rule on a similar issue (the “predictive” model).123 Both 
applications were similar insofar as they looked for majority 
agreements in the decision. 
The Supreme Court’s first application of Marks’ narrowest 
grounds test was fairly straightforward. In City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Company124 the Court seamlessly discerned the 
narrowest grounds of the plurality opinion at issue.125 The Court held 
that a 1949 plurality decision, Kovacs v. Cooper,126 manifested 
majority assent to a critical distinction between Kovacs and a 1948 
case, Saia v. New York .127 Both the implicit consensus model and the 
predictive model would have reached the same results in City of 
Lakewood because, as the Court stated, the narrowest grounds were 
easily discernible.128 
The Court subsequently applied the test two additional times 
without problem. In the 1994 case Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,129 the Court employed the 
Marks test, citing its application in the 1992 version of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.130 
However, the Court later conceded the Marks test’s limited 
applicability to plurality decisions. In Nichols v. United States,131 the 
Court revisited Baldasar v. Illinois,132 a splintered decision that dealt 
with the constitutionality of certain sentencing considerations.133 
The Nichols Court abandoned the narrowest grounds test.134 The 
 
 123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 
1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992). 
 124. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).  
 125. Id. at 764-65 & n.9. 
 126. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
 127. 334 U.S. 558 (1948); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 764. 
 128. 486 U.S. at 764-65 & n.9. 
 129. 510 U.S. 1309 (1994). 
 130. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (citing Planned Parenthood, 510 U.S. at 1310 n.2.).  
 131. 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
 132. 446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 133. Specifically, as construed by the Baldasar plurality, the defendant in Nichols argued 
that a sentencing court’s consideration of his prior convictions during a proceeding in which the 
defendant was not represented by counsel violated the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. 
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 741. 
 134. A majority of five Justices spoke as the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice 
Souter concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the precedential value that the majority 
accorded to Baldasar. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 749-54 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun, 
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Court noted that the circuits were split regarding the proper 
application of the test135 and some circuits found the test inapplicable 
because they could not discern the narrowest grounds.136 According 
to the Nichols Court, the narrowest grounds test proved easier to state 
than to apply.137 The Court found that it would not be “useful” to 
apply the narrowest grounds test to its “utmost logical possibility,” 
given the confusion amongst the lower courts attempting to interpret 
Baldasar.138 The Court accordingly held that it was free to overrule 
Baldasar, which it then did.139 
Nichols suggests that the Court abandoned the narrowest grounds 
test, but the Court subsequently returned to Marks for guidance. In a 
puzzling follow-up to Nichols, the Supreme Court applied the 
narrowest grounds test in 1997 without comment in O’Dell v. 
Netherland.140 
However, Nichols and O’Dell are potentially reconcilable. The 
“logically possible” narrowest grounds in Nichols baffled both the 
lower courts and the Supreme Court itself.141 In O’Dell, on the other 
hand, the narrowest grounds were clear to both the lower courts and 
 
Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the Court can and should apply a narrowest 
grounds test to Baldasar, thereby yielding a different judgment. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 754-57 
(Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 135. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745 (citing Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 
889 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that Justice Blackmun’s concurrence represented the controlling 
precedent of Baldasar) and United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that Justice Marshall’s concurrence represented the controlling precedent of 
Baldasar)). “State courts have similarly divided.” Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745 (referring to 742 
n.7, the disparate opinions: Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ark. 1984); Hlad v. State, 
565 So. 2d 762 (Fla. App. 1990), aff’d, 585 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1991); State v. Vares, 801 
P.2d 555, 557 (Haw. 1990); Sheffield v. Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990)); 
State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990).  
 136. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745 (citing United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499-500 
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 219 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990); and Schindler 
v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
 137. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745 (stating that the narrowest grounds test “is more easily stated 
than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in Baldasar.”). 
 138. Id. at 745-56. The Court stated: “We think it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to 
the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that 
have considered it. The degree of confusion following a splintered decision such as Baldasar is 
itself a reason for reexamining that decision.” Id. 
 139. Id. at 748-49. 
 140. 521 U.S. 151 (1997). 
 141. See supra  note 137 and accompanying text. 
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to the Supreme Court.142 Perhaps the Court thereby implicitly 
approved “selective application” of the narrowest grounds test, 
depending on whether the lower court finds the rule helpful or not. 
As such, the lower courts may have to determine on a case-by-case 
basis when the application of the narrowest grounds test is an 
illogical “logical possibility”143 and therefore inappropriate. 
Such a standard, while somewhat salvaging the narrowest grounds 
test, still would allow different courts to find different narrowest 
grounds in the same Supreme Court case. This was the situation when 
the lower courts tried to interpret Baldasar before the Court decided 
Nichols.144 
Moreover, it is important to note that the Court has not applied the 
Marks rule in all appropriate circumstances.145 For example, in Texas 
v. Brown146 the Court examined a plurality decision in a precedential 
case, Coolidge v. New Hampshire.147 In Coolidge a plurality of four 
Justices148 held that officers could seize evidence pursuant to the 
“plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement149 only when they discovered the evidence 
“inadvertently.”150 Four other Justices, each writing separately and 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that inadvertence 
was not necessary for a constitutional seizure of evidence in plain 
view.151 Justice Harlan, providing the fifth and deciding vote, 
 
 142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 143. See id. Indeed, it seems that when the “logical possibility” of a rule is unacceptable, 
the rule is necessarily illogical. 
 144. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
 145. See infra note 155. 
 146. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
 147. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 148. The plurality in Coolidge consisted of Justices Marshall, Stewart, Douglas and 
Brennan. Id. 
 149. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
 150. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469. 
 151. Id. at 492 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 506 (Black, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 510 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Id. at 516 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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concurred in the judgment but offered no rationale for his position.152 
The Brown Court revisited the inadvertence issue but ignored the 
Marks test altogether.153 The Court held that the inadvertence 
requirement was “not a binding precedent,” although it was “the 
considered opinion of four Members of the Court” and should be “the 
point of reference for further discussion of the issue.”154 
On numerous occasions, in fact, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts failed to follow majority-decision Supreme Court precedent.155 
For instance, the Supreme Court perpetually revisits and overrules or 
modifies its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.156 While adherence to 
majority decision precedent remains the norm,157 majoritarianism 
clearly is not talismanic.158 That is, the question of how many Justices 
joined a particular opinion is not dispositive of its precedential value. 
American jurisprudence needs a different approach to the plurality 
problem. 
V. AN OLD APPROACH TO A MODERN PROBLEM  
Chief Justice Marshall brought force and authority to the Supreme 
Court.159 His abandonment of the seriatim practice and his insistence 
on consolidated opinions brought a unified voice to a Court that 
previously spoke only in individual voices.160 A unified voice brought 
 
 152. Id. at 490 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 153. Id. at 737. 
 154. Id. The Court ultimately and entirely rejected the inadvertence requirement in Horton 
v. California , 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
 155. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) 
(disregarding majority decision precedent of Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), in a 
T itle VII decision and appearing to adopt Dothard’s dissent instead); Cases v. United States, 
131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (disregarding Supreme Court precedent in the Second 
Amendment case of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251 (1918); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 
(1937) (implicitly overruling E.C. Knight Co .); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) 
(overruling Hammer); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (ignoring E.C. Knight Co.); 
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Usery); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(overruling Wickard).  
 157. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
 158. See id. at 59-66. 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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authority to the Court and enabled the institution to act as a leading 
judicial and political force. Although strongly opposed at the time by 
citizens who insisted upon a more modest role for the Supreme 
Court,161 Chief Justice Marshall’s innovations became Supreme Court 
traditions.162 Few people today question the propriety of the changes 
he instituted. 
Chief Justice Marshall fulfilled Chief Justice Jay’s quest to 
establish the Court as an instrument of national unity. The Court’s 
role under Chief Justice Jay, the role that he hoped to transcend, was 
characterized by the passivity underlying the popular understanding 
of the Court in the early republic. As demonstrated in the aftermath 
of Chisholm, the public largely wanted the Court to assume a more 
modest role.163 The push to ratify the Eleventh Amendment left Chief 
Justice Jay distraught, but simultaneously salvaged America in the 
minds of many. 
Chief Justice Marshall abandoned the seriatim practice of the Jay 
Court.164 In doing so, he helped realize the common vision of the 
Court advanced by both men. While Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision forged a strong identity for the Court, it also created a 
problem that did not exist in the Jay Court. Because the introduction 
of consolidated opinions coincided with the growing strength of the 
Court, the legal community came to demand majority opinions. 
Often, the result was plurality. 
A plurality decision may raise more questions than it answers.165 
Tidewater Transfer, Apodaca, and Union Gas demonstrate the 
particular difficulties of plurality decisions.166 In Tidewater Transfer, 
conflicting minorities consolidated to establish a plurality decision 
with which differing majorities disagreed.167 Similarly, in Apodaca 
the dissenters lost 5-4 on the judgment even though they commanded 
a majority of support for each relevant underlying issue.168 In Union 
 
 161. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra  notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra  Part I.  
 165. See supra Parts II and III. 
 166. See supra Part III. 
 167. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra  notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
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Gas one Justice forced an opposite judgment by changing his 
argument midstream to accommodate the majority of Justices who 
disagreed with him on an underlying issue.169 To further confuse the 
issue of plurality decision interpretation, Union Gas subsequently 
was overruled in 1996, in part because it was a plurality decision.170 
The Supreme’s Court’s new “narrowest grounds” test, first 
articulated in Marks,171 is an inadequate solution. First, the test is 
inapplicable if the plurality and the concurrences cannot discern the 
“narrowest grounds” and agree to them. Second, the Supreme Court 
inconsistently follows the test, as demonstrated in the series of cases 
including Nichols, O’Dell, and Brown.172 Finally, the Court itself 
admitted in Nichols that the Marks test is not the final word on 
plurality-decision interpretation.173 
Further, the demand for a majority rationale is curious because the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts do not always follow a clear-
majority Supreme Court opinion. While majority Supreme Court 
decisions generally stand as precedent, this is not an absolute 
principle. In fact, in some areas of the law majority decisions of the 
Court regularly are disregarded or overruled.174 Thus, majoritarianism 
is clearly non-dispositive. Even if lower courts should selectively 
apply the narrowest grounds test to cases of apparent majority 
agreement, the true extent of its applicability remains unclear. 
Accordingly, the development of sound jurisprudence to interpret 
plurality decisions requires a fresh look at the early Court. During the 
Jay era, the American legal community viewed a powerful Supreme 
Court with skepticism. Public sentiment also was overwhelmingly 
critical of a strong Court.175 The reaction to Chisholm, culminating in 
the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, suggested that 
Americans generally believed that the Supreme Court had 
overstepped its authority.176 
 
 169. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra  note 119 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra  notes 132-54 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra  notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra  note 155-56. 
 175. See supra  notes 28-29, 43 and accompanying text. 
 176. See id. 
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However, Chief Justice Marshall’s radical innovations created 
their own fallout, exemplified by the confusion surrounding plurality 
decisions. The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, struggles to 
extract ratios decidendis from fractured opinions. They struggle 
because Chief Justice Marshall’s era vested tremendous authority in 
the words of the Court. According to the Supreme Court, lawyers and 
judges usually177 must find the authoritative narrowest grounds from 
the Court’s plurality opinions,178 and as this Note demonstrates, this 
is no easy task. 
Thomas Jefferson foresaw the inherent dangers of promoting the 
interests of national power and unity through opinion 
consolidation.179 While perhaps he did not foresee the specific 
problem of plurality opinion interpretation, Jefferson has been 
vindicated. Our modern legal community must seriously reconsider 
the pre-Marshall skepticism of a powerful Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s modern role stems from the innovations of Chief 
Justice Marshall.180 The problem of plurality decision interpretation is 
a consequence of this modern role , by which the Court prescribes its 
own overweening power. No “test”—recommended by the Supreme 
Court or otherwise—can dispel the confusion surrounding these 
plurality decisions.  
If the legal community is willing to reexamine the skeptical 
attitudes toward the Court popular during Chief Justice Jay’s tenure, 
then the problem of plurality decisions necessarily will wane. If the 
Jeffersonian and other popular understandings of government in the 
early republic are worthy of our attention, the Supreme Court need 
not exercise all the power it does now. The American legal system 
should demand modesty from its Supreme Court in its decisions. 
Only then will lawyers and judges no longer be forced to accept the 
 
 177. See supra  notes 141-43. The adverb “usually” is actually appropriate only if Nichols 
and O’Dell are reconcilable. Id. If they are irreconcilable, then even more confusion would 
surround the interpretation of plurality decisions.  
 178. See supra  note 119 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra  Part I. 
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inherently muddled and fragmented decisions the Court hands down 
to them. But, if we ignore the founding principles of our government 
and blindly follow the popular principles of the modern legal age, 
then plurality confusion will remain with us indefinitely.  
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